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Retrenchment on Entrenchment 
Stewart E. Sterk* 
May Congress, by following the process for enactment of an ordinary 
statute, preclude future Congresses from repealing a new or existing statute? 
According to the United States Supreme Court1 and a host of eminent legal 
scholars,2 (buttressed by the work of political and legal theorists writing over 
the course of several centuries) the answer to that question is no.3 In a recent 
article, Professors Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule contend that the 
traditional answer is wrong, and that the rule prohibiting "entrenchment" of 
statutes should be discarded.4 
Posner and Vermeule argue that entrenchment is constitutionally per-
missible and normatively attractive.5 In particular, they contend that formal 
legislative entrenchment does not differ materially from many practices that 
legislatures have long followed and that courts have long sanctioned.6 In ad-
dition, they argue that entrenchment enables legislatures to achieve valuable 
objectives that would otherwise be difficult to realize.7 Hence, on the view of 
Posner and Vermeule, critics of entrenchment bear the burden of demon-
strating why entrenchment is worthy of concern.8 
* Mack Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University. The 
author would like to thank Michael Herz, Melanie Leslie, John McGinnis, and Kevin Stack for 
valuable comments, and Elliot Gardner for helpful research assistance. 
1 See United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 873 (1996) (quoting Manigault v. 
Springs, 199 U .S. 473, 487 (1905), in which the Court had written that "a general law . .. may be 
repealed, amended or disregarded by the legislatures which enacted it," and "is not binding upon 
any subsequent legislature." The Court in Winstar decided the case, involving the enforceability 
of a government contract, on other grounds); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87 (1810) (acknowledging 
the principle " that one legislature is competent to repeal any act which a former legislature was 
competent to pass; and that one legislature cannot abridge the powers of a succeeding 
legislature"). 
2 See, e.g., Charles L. Black, Jr. , Amending the Constitution: A Letter to a Congressman, 
82 YALE L.J. 189, 191 (1972); David Dana & Susan P. Koniak, Bargaining in the Shadow of 
Democracy, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 473, 526-36 (1999); Julian N. Eule, Temporal Limits on the Legis-
lative Mandate: Entrenchment and Retroactivity, 1987 AM. B. Fm .JND. REs. J . 379, 404-05; Paul 
W. Kahn, Gramm-Rudman and the Capacity of Congress to Control the Future, 13 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 185, 196-201 (1986); Michael J . Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The En-
trenchment Problem, 85 GEo. L.J. 491, 505-06 (1997); John 0 . McGinnis & Michael B. Rap-
paport, The Constitutionality of Legislative Supermajority Requirements: A Defense, 105 YALE 
L.J. 483, 503-07 (1995). 
3 See, e.g. , FRANCIS BACON, THE HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF KING HENRY THE SEVENTH 
135 (Jerry Weingberger ed., Cornell Univ. Press 1996) (1622); JEREMY BENTHAM, THE BooK OF 
FALLACIES 82-112 (Peregrine Bingham ed., John & H .L. Hunt 1824); 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARI ES 90; THOMAS M. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 125-26 (Little, Brown, 
and Co. 1868). 
4 Eric A . Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, 111 
YALE L.J. 1665 (2002). 
5 Id. at 1666. 
6 Id. at 1685-88, 1705. 
7 Id. at 1670-73. 
8 Id. at 1705. 
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Posner and Vermeule have not made their case. First, they render their 
normative argument incoherent by refusing to take a position on judicial en-
forcement of entrenched statutes. If judicial enforcement matters-and it 
does-then the normative case for entrenchment must depend, in some mea-
sure, on whether entrenched statutes are judicially enforceable. 
Second, Posner and Vermeule are wrong when they claim that entrench-
ment is not materially different from other legislative actions that affect the 
future. Other government decisions, particularly those that commit future 
resources, have the potential to impose costs on future generations, but they 
do not have the potential-as entrenchment does-to prevent future legisla-
tures from allocating those costs among members of the polity. Nor do tradi-
tional legislative actions, even when they impose future costs, withdraw from 
successor legislatures the power to repudiate those actions. Moreover, tradi-
tional legislative actions, like private contracts, are typically accompanied by 
escape hatches that would not be available in a regime where a statute that 
conflicts with an entrenched statute would be, in Posner and Vermeule's 
words, "straightforwardly illegal. "9 
Third, Posner and Vermeule's normative argument ignores the impact 
the entrenchment alternative would have on other forms of commitment cur-
rently available to legislatures. If legislatures were empowered to provide 
ironclad guarantees against subsequent repeal or modification, any more 
measured promise would signal weaker government commitment than the 
same promise would signal in a regime that prohibits entrenchment. That is, 
permitting legislatures to entrench does not simply afford the government 
one additional tool; the availability of entrenchment dulls other valuable 
tools currently available to government. 
I. What Is Entrenchment? 
A. The Posner/Vermeule Definition 
Because they conclude that entrenchment is a "promiscuous word in the 
academic literature, "10 Posner and Vermeule take pains to offer their own 
definition: "[T]he enactment of either statutes or internal legislative rules 
that are binding against subsequent legislative action in the same form. "11 
Posner and Vermeule offer several examples of entrenching statutes: (1) a 
law that provides no bicycles in the park, and the prohibition on bicycles in 
the park cannot be repealed with less than a two-thirds majority; (2) a law 
perpetually dedicating public lands in the capital for use as Rock Creek Park; 
(3) a statute permanently establishing a particular town as the county seat; 
and (4) a law providing that "this statute (including this provision) may never 
be repealed (even by a unanimous vote)."12 
To Posner and Vermeule, a regime authorizing entrenchment is one that 
permits the entrenching legislature to decide the intertemporal choice-of-law 
question. In the regime they advocate, "[w]hether the later-enacted statute 
9 Id. at 1670. 
10 Id. at 1666. 
11 Id. at 1667. 
12 Id. at 1667-68. 
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governs in the case of a conflict depends on what the earlier legislature has 
provided."13 A subsequent legislature is bound by a prior legislature's en-
trenching statute (assuming that the entrenching statute is not otherwise 
unconstitutional). 
B. Judicial Enforcement 
In a peculiar twist, Posner and Vermeule do not insist that the en-
trenched statute be judicially enforceable. They contend that arguments 
about the legality of entrenchment are analytically distinct from arguments 
about justiciability, and they "take no position here on whether courts should 
enforce entrenched statutes when subsequent legislatures violate the en-
trenchment by enacting a contrary statute."14 This refusal to take a position 
on judicial enforcement renders incoherent both their constitutional argu-
ment and their normative argument. 
Consider first their constitutional position, which is that subsequent leg-
islatures are bound by entrenching legislation, and that any contrary statutes 
are "straightforwardly illegal. "15 That position can certainly be reconciled 
with judicial invalidation of any statute that contradicts the entrenching stat-
ute. More difficult to understand, however, is how the position can be 
squared with other potential judicial responses to entrenchment. 
First, suppose the Supreme Court were to determine that controversies 
over entrenchment were not justiciable-an alternative Posner and Vermeule 
appear to suggest.16 While that position may be verbally consistent with their 
conclusion that entrenched statutes are binding on subsequent legislatures, 
the non-justiciability position, as a practical matter, is often equivalent to a 
position that rejects entrenchment. Examine the no-bicycles-in-the-park ex-
ample offered by Posner and Vermeule. Suppose that, despite a provision in 
the initial legislation requiring a two-thirds majority to repeal the prohibition 
on bicycles, a subsequent legislature were, by a simple majority, to repeal the 
prohibition on bicycles in the park. A local prosecutor-a disciple of Posner 
and Vermeule-takes the entrenching statute seriously, and prosecutes a bi-
cyclist. What would it mean for a court to conclude that the validity of the 
entrenchment statute was non-justiciable? Ordinarily, when courts deter-
mine that particular disputes are non-justiciable, they do so because the Con-
stitution has allocated decision-making power to one of the other branches of 
government.17 In the context of an entrenching statute, concluding that 
13 Id. at 1668. 
14 Id. at 1670. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. (concluding that "arguments about the legality of entrenchment are analytically dis-
tinct from arguments about the justiciability of entrenchment"). 
11 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). The Court in Baker noted that: 
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a 
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate po-
litical department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for 
resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination 
of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's under-
taking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordi-
nate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a 
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courts should defer to the legislature begs the ultimate question: which legis-
lature, the one that enacted the entrenching statute, or the one that has en-
acted inconsistent legislation?18 If non-justiciability means deference to the 
current legislature, then the prosecution of the bicyclist must be dismissed, 
and the entrenched legislation does not constrain the bicyclist's conduct.19 
The other alternative is that the entrenched statute is judicially enforceable, 
permitting the prosecution to go forward. From the perspective of the prose-
cutor and the bicyclist, non-justiciability provides no middle ground. 
The second alternative is that the Supreme Court determines that en-
trenchment is not binding on subsequent legislatures, either because en-
trenchment would infringe on the subsequent legislature's inalienable police 
power,20 or for some other reason. If the Supreme Court reaches that con-
clusion, it is difficult to see how a statute contrary to the entrenching statute 
could be "straightforwardly illegal." At that point, the Court would have 
rejected the PosnerNermeule argument, holding either that the second legis-
lature is universally free to ignore an entrenching statute, or free under some 
circumstances to ignore the entrenching statute. By what reference point, 
then, would the second legislature's action be illegal? Posner and Vermeule 
do not suggest an answer. 
The analysis so far establishes that the illegality of a legislature's deci-
sion to ignore an entrenching statute cannot be evaluated without reference 
to judicial enforcement. But Posner and Vermeule's abstention from any dis-
cussion of judicial enforcement is equally troubling for their normative argu-
ment. Posner and Vermeule argue that a regime permitting entrenchment 
can provide a number of advantages. First among them is the increased abil-
ity of government to make credible commitments to persons and entities with 
whom the government deals.21 But the credibility of those commitments de-
pends, to a considerable extent, on the government's accountability in judi-
cial proceedings. Judicial enforcement may make entrenchment more 
attractive (because the legislature's commitment will be more credible) or 
political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifa-
rious pronouncements by various departments on one question. 
Id. See generally John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Un-
derstanding of War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 167, 182-88 (1996) (cataloguing judicial deference to 
the political branches, and particularly the President, when individuals challenge war-related 
activities conducted by the executive branch). 
18 Cf Kahn, supra note 2, at 198 (noting that "[t]he principle of respect for a coequal 
branch does not indicate which of two genuinely contradictory rules to follow"). 
19 The situation is analogous to the one facing a soldier who challenges an order deploying 
him abroad in an action that he believes exceeds the President's war powers authority. If the 
court concludes that the controversy is non-justiciable, the President's decision stands, and the 
soldier is afforded no relief. See, e.g., Ange v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 509 (D.D.C. 1990) (dismissing, 
as non-justiciable, a soldier's challenge to his deployment in the Persian Gulf War). 
20 In the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court developed a doctrine that no legislature 
was empowered to bargain away the power of its successors to legislate for the public health and 
morals. See, e.g., Butcher's Union Slaughter-House v. Crescent City Livestock Landing Co., 111 
U.S. 746 (1884). For a more extensive discussion, see Stewart E. Sterk, The Continuity of Legis-
latures: Of Contracts and the Contracts Clause, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 647, 675-85 (1988); Dana & 
Koniak, supra note 2, at 488-95. 
21 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 4, at 1671. 
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less attractive (because the inability to escape from prior commitments will 
impose more onerous costs on subsequent legislatures), but any normative 
argument for entrenchment must at least consider-as Posner and 
Vermeule's does not-the impact of judicial enforcement. 
C. What Does it Mean for a Statute to Be "Binding"? 
Posner and Vermeule define entrenchment to mean enactment of stat-
utes binding against subsequent legislative action. Posner and Vermeule 
have an absolutist understanding of the word "binding:" if one legislature 
entrenches a statute, "any contrary statutes are straightforwardly illegal."22 
Although their conception of what it means for a commitment to be binding 
is certainly plausible, their conception is not inevitable, and it differs signifi-
cantly from the conception of a binding obligation in private law. 
First, Posner and Vermeule's position appears to be that by making a 
verbal promise, the legislature has conferred legal rights on one or more 
promisees. By contrast, if I promise to give my daughter $20,000 when she 
reaches age 21, and I promise that I will not change my mind before making 
the payment, my promise may not confer legal rights on my daughter in the 
absence of consideration or reliance. 
Moreover, even when our legal system acknowledges the existence of a 
binding legal obligation, the word "binding" is not free from complication. 
For instance, courts and scholars often speak of binding contracts, but courts 
do not generally require performance from parties who undertake binding 
contract obligations; instead, courts require the obligor to pay money dam-
ages caused by the breach.23 And our legal system has routinely refused to 
enforce entrenching provisions in contracts. When the parties agree to a pro-
vision requiring a breaching party to pay money damages out of proportion 
to actual damages, courts typically invalidate the provision as an unenforce-
able "penalty;" they conclude that parties may not include a damage provi-
sion as a club to assure performance, rather than just as compensation for 
failure to perform.24 
22 Id. at 1670. 
23 As Holmes put it, "[T]he duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction 
that you must pay damages if you do not keep it, and nothing else." Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 462 (1897). 
Moreover, the measure of damages itself may be controversial. As Professor Had-
field explained: "In contract law ... the promisor's obligation and the promisee's 
entitlement are separable, and the binding nature of promises still does not tell us 
whether it is just to consider that the promisee, at the moment of contracting, gains 
a right to the promised act or article, or its equivalent in money." 
Gillian Hadfield, Of Sovereignty and Contract: Damages for Breach of Contract by Government, 
8 s. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 467, 498 (1999). 
24 See, e.g., Truck Rent-A-Center, Inc. v. Puritan Farms 2nd, Inc., 361 N.E.2d 1015, 1018 
(N.Y. 1977). This case stated: 
A clause which provides for an amount plainly disproportionate to real damage is 
not intended to provide fair compensation but to secure performance by the com-
pulsion of the very disproportion. . . . If ... the amount fixed is plainly or grossly 
disproportionate to the probable loss, the provision calls for a penalty and will not 
be enforced. 
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Finally, private law includes a set of built-in excuses to the performance 
of "binding" obligations. The most obvious is the law of bankruptcy, which 
permits individuals and entities facing dire emergency to avoid otherwise 
binding obligations.25 In addition, the doctrines of commercial impracticabil-
ity, mistake, and even capacity, often operate to excuse parties from obliga-
tions that appear binding.26 
My point is simple. A variety of understandings of the word "binding" 
are possible. To be complete, a normative or constitutional discussion of en-
trenchment must consider alternative conceptions of binding obligations. 
The PosnerNermeule discussion does not. 
II. The Normative Case for Entrenchment 
A. The Promise of Entrenchment 
Posner and Vermeule correctly identify a number of attractions gener-
ated by a regime that permits entrenchment of legislation.27 When a legisla-
ture targets problems that have a potential long-term impact, the opportunity 
to entrench legislation adds an arrow to the legislative quiver. Suppose Con-
gress wants constituents to save more money for retirement. Congress can 
create tax incentives for increased saving, but those incentives might be even 
more effective if Congress could ensure that those savings would not be 
eroded by a subsequent change in the tax structure. Conversely, if Congress 
wants constituents to spend more, Congress might pursue that objective by 
providing more generous retirement benefits, but the strategy might be more 
successful if Congress could assure current workers that those generous ben-
efits will not be reduced in the future. That is, if government has the power 
to reassure constituents that legal rights will remain stable, government will 
find it easier to induce reliance by those constituents.28 Moreover, as Posner 
and Vermeule also point out, government's need to induce reliance is not 
limited to constituents; government may also find it useful to induce reliance 
in foreign adversaries or potential adversaries.29 
Government has a number of mechanisms for providing this kind of re-
assurance. For instance, it can take steps that would make it politically very 
unpopular for a future government to undo legislation enacted today. But, as 
Id. See generally Mark P. Gergen, A Defense of Judicial Reconstruction of Contracts, 71 IND. L.J. 
45, 59-69 (1995) (analyzing and defending the prohibition against penalties). 
25 Anthony Kronman has justified the "fresh start" in bankruptcy as a mechanism for re-
leasing an individual from "a series of past decisions he now regrets." Anthony Kronman, Pater-
nalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763, 785 (1983). In particular, Kronman 
concluded that promisors should be protected against enforcement of agreements that proceed 
on mistaken assumptions about future goals. Id. at 780-81; see also THOMAS JACKSON, THE 
Lorne AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 235, 241 (1986). 
26 For further discussion, see Sterk, supra note 20, at 693-94. 
27 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 4, at 1670-73. 
28 Posner and Vermeule suggest welfare reform legislation as another example. If the gov-
ernment seeks to induce persons on welfare to seek employment, the incentive structure will be 
less effective if the government cannot "commit itself to withhold transfers from people who fail 
to obtain employment within the designated period of time." Id. at 1671. 
29 Id. at 1672. 
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Posner and Vermeule point out, both the current legislature and the future 
legislature might prefer entrenchment to some of these alternative mecha-
nisms.30 In these circumstances, entrenchment is a more attractive option. 
B. The Problems with Entrenchment 
Much as entrenchment adds an arrow to the quiver of each legislature, it 
also removes one: each legislature is barred from solving current problems 
by undoing the work of a predecessor. Entrenchment, then, raises issues of 
intergenerational equity, of foresight, and of agency costs. This section ex-
plores these issues. 
1. Intergenerational Equity 
Consider an extreme example of entrenchment. Congress enacts a stat-
ute entrenching all existing legislation against modification, repeal, or supple-
mentation. Under the PosnerNermeule scheme, this sort of entrenchment 
would be binding on future Congresses. But the hypothetical statute, if bind-
ing, would permit a current majority to trump the wishes of future majorities 
forever, and would conflict with the principle that popular sovereignty re-
mains constant through time.31 The resulting intertemporal distribution of 
sovereign power is difficult to justify on any principled basis. 
From a practical standpoint, political pressures would make it highly un-
likely that any Congress would enact such an extreme statute. But it is cer-
tainly possible to imagine a last-gasp Congress entrenching much legislation 
that it believes its successors would otherwise repeal. Imagine how attractive 
entrenchment would be to a Democratic Congress facing the prospect of a 
new Republican Congress and President. Indeed, long experience-from 
Marbury v. Madison32 onward-teaches that outgoing administrations do as 
much as they can to extend the tenure of both their policies and their cronies, 
whether or not the extensions can be justified on any principled basis.33 
Posner and Vermeule defend entrenchment from intergenerational eq-
uity criticisms on the ground that entrenchment is not fundamentally differ-
ent from existing practices that subjugate future legislatures to the wishes of 
their predecessors. They emphasize that "a Congress will inevitably burden 
future Congresses, for the simple reason that the earlier Congress comes first 
and cannot avoid actions that will tum out to hinder the later Congress. "34 
30 Id. 
31 See Kahn, supra note 2, at 199; Klarman, supra note 2, at 507-09. 
32 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U .S. 137 (1803). Marbury was one of a group of persons who 
secured last-minute appointments from President John Adams. Marbury successfully challenged 
the power of the new administration's secretary of state to withhold his commission as a justice 
of the peace in the District of Columbia. 
33 See Peter Raven-Hansen, Making Agencies Follow Orders: Judicial Review of Agency 
Violations of Executive Order 12,291 , 1983 DUKE L.J. 285, 295 n.48 (describing President Rea-
gan's postponement of 172 "midnight" regulations promulgated by previous administration); see 
also Deirdre Davidson & Jenna Greene, Clinton Regulators: Getting the Last Laugh, LEGAL 
TIMES, December 4, 2000, at 24 (detailing scramble of Clinton appointees to "leave their mark" 
in the face of a probable Republican administration; they placed particular emphasis on regula-
tions that could not easily be undone by the successor administration). 
34 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 4, at 1687. 
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By way of example, they note, correctly, that a decision by a current legisla-
ture to replace concrete with gravel on park walkways makes it more expen-
sive for future legislatures to permit or encourage use of bicycles in the 
park.35 
Virtually no decision a legislature makes today is without implications 
for the future. A rule that prohibited legislatures from taking actions that 
affect the choices available to their successors would paralyze every legisla-
ture-present and future. 36 Posner and Vermeule therefore start with the 
sensible premise that each legislature has authority to act in ways that con-
strain their successors. But it requires a significant jump to move from that 
premise-that legislatures must be authorized to take some actions that af-
fect the future-to the PosnerNermeule conclusion that a current legislature 
should be permitted to bind the future in any way the legislature sees fit, 
subject only to express constitutional constraints. Yet it is that jump that 
Posner and Vermeule make-without justification-in staking out their posi-
tion on entrenchment. 
Put another way, let us assume that every generation, whatever its tem-
poral position, would endorse a rule permitting each generation to take vari-
ous actions, even if those actions constrain the choices available to future 
generations. Among those would be paving roads in parks-the example 
Posner and Vermeule use. So long as a generation has the power to build 
schools, roads, and aircraft carriers, the power to regulate securities transac-
tions and pre-school education, let us assume that generation would readily 
concede the same power to its successors and predecessors, recognizing that 
each decision made by one generation would affect the range of decisions 
available to its successors. This assumption does not establish that each gen-
eration would endorse a rule permitting a legislative majority in one genera-
tion to preclude its successors from taking action on matters of contemporary 
concern. Consider an issue as significant as wealth distribution. Would any 
generation support a regime in which one generation-acting through ordi-
nary legislation-could entrench a wealth tax of 75%, or of zero, for all sub-
sequent generations? Perhaps an instrumental case could be made for 
permitting such entrenchment, but the case for permitting entrenchment 
does not follow inevitably from the fact that much ordinary legislative action 
constrains future choices. 
Indeed, a regime that permits unconstrained legislative entrenchment 
permits one generation to control the destiny of the next in ways that are 
significantly different from ordinary legislative decisions. When the legisla-
ture decides to build a bridge or a canal, it imposes significant constraints on 
future legislatures. If a future legislature would prefer a different location for 
the bridge or canal, the future legislature's preferences will not prevail unless 
the perceived advantages of a new location justify the cost of building the 
new bridge, tearing out the old one, and replacing the existing infrastructure 
35 Id. at 1687-89. 
36 As Dana and Koniak put it, "Majority rule would be meaningless without the ability to 
decide matters that have future consequences on the physical world or mental perceptions." 
Dana & Koniak, supra note 2, at 530-31. · 
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that developed around the location of the old bridge. If, however, the advan-
tages of the new bridge are significant enough, the legislature can authorize 
the new bridge, and assess the costs of the new bridge among its constituents 
as it sees fit. The prior legislature imposed a cost on its successors; how each 
subsequent legislature deals with the cost is for the subsequent legislature to 
decide.37 Entrenchment, however, has the potential not only to impose costs, 
but to preclude the subsequent legislature from engaging in any cost-benefit 
analysis ("no future legislature may ever permit bicycles in the park"), or to 
mandate that the costs of reversing the earlier action be borne by particular 
members of a future generation ("all taxation shall be levied on a per capita 
basis"). These constraints have the potential to limit a future legislature's 
power over the destiny of its constituents in ways that the constituents are 
likely to find far less acceptable than the mere imposition of cost. 
Moreover, a variety of provisions in current law embody concerns about 
intergenerational equity. Within the Federal Constitution, Congress is au-
thorized to create patent and copyright monopolies, but only for a limited 
time.38 In addition, many state constitutions limit the power of state legisla-
tures to borrow money.39 Similarly, environmental statutes, such as the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA")40 and a number of little NEPAs 
enacted by the states,41 implement procedures requiring agencies to account 
for long-term environmental harms that might result from government ac-
tion. Although none of these provisions deal with formal entrenchment, they 
reflect a concern that even when ordinary legislative action may be required, 
intergenerational equity concerns should not be ignored. 
My argument here is not that intergenerational equity concerns, by 
themselves, defeat any normative argument for legislative entrenchment, al-
though others have made that argument.42 Instead, my argument is that in-
37 For example, New York City has long contemplated construction of a subway beneath 
Second Avenue. Portions of the subway were built, at considerable expense, before construction 
was abandoned in the 1970s when the City's priorities shifted. See Edward C. Burks, Work Is 
Stopped on Subway Line, N.Y . TIMES, September 26, 1975, at 41. 
38 U .S. CoNsT. art. I., § 8. The Supreme Court recently upheld the constitutionality of the 
recent copyright term extension act. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769 (2003). In that context, 
Justice Breyer observed in his dissent that " the express grant of a perpetual copyright would 
unquestioningly violation the textual requirement that the authors' rights be only 'for limited 
time."' Id. (Breyer, J. , dissenting). 
39 These limitations take a variety of forms. A number of state constitutions impose abso-
lute limits on state debt. See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. IX, § 5 (placing a $350,000 limit on state 
debt) . Others require a referendum before a state may incur debt. See. , e.g., N.Y . CoNsT. art. 
VII, § 11. Still others require a legislative supermajority. See, e.g., DEL. CONST. art VIII, § III. 
For further discussion, and for examination of these limitations in practice, see Stewart E . Sterk 
& Elizabeth S. Goldman, Controlling Legislative Shortsightedness: The Effectiveness of Constitu-
tional Debt Limitations, 1991 Wis. L. REv. 1301 , 1315-17, 1329-58 (1991). 
40 42 u.s.c. § 4332 (2000). 
41 See, e.g., N.Y. ENVTL. CoNSERv. LAW§ 8-0101-0117 (McKinney 2000). 
42 See Dana & Koniak, supra note 2, at 541 ("Our claim is that the power to change the 
law ... is critical to sovereignty in our political system and should not be transferred to private 
entities."); Eule, supra note 2, at 405 ("The fundamental, albeit admittedly often suspect, as-
sumption of American political life-that legislative action reflects current majoritarian prefer-
ences-could be finally laid to rest if shifting majorities were unable to alter prior majoritarian 
choices."). 
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tergenerational equity concerns cannot be dismissed simply because many 
actions taken by one legislature will inevitably constrain future choices. Pro-
ponents of legislative entrenchment must make a positive case for permitting 
one legislature to bar subsequent legislation of the same kind; they cannot 
rest on the truism that the present always affects the future. 
2. The Problem of Foresight 
Neither individuals nor collective entities are blessed with perfect fore-
sight. As a result, when individuals and collective entities make future-re-
garding decisions, they make mistakes. These mistakes may be of different 
types-the decision-maker may make mistakes in predicting events that oc-
cur in the world, or in predicting future preferences.43 Despite the risks of 
error, both individuals and collective entities, including legislatures, routinely 
make decisions with future impacts. There is no practical alternative: doing 
nothing also has a future impact. As a result, we typically permit each cur-
rent legislature to make future-regarding decisions because no other contem-
porary individual or institution is in a better position to make those decisions. 
As time passes, however, subsequent legislatures acquire information 
not available to its predecessors. Because of that additional information, a 
legislature sitting in 2020 would be in a better position to perceive the prefer-
ences and interests of 2020 constituents than would the legislature sitting in 
2002.44 Why, then, permit the 2002 legislature, with its imperfect foresight, to 
bind the 2020 legislature? The PosnerNermeule answer rests on the premise 
that entrenchment increases the power of government to induce reliance, 
which in turn will make it easier for the government to realize its policy 
objectives.45 
The corollary to that response is that if the earlier legislature's action 
generates no reliance and no change of position, then there is no reason for a 
subsequent legislature to be bound to the entrenchment decision made by its 
predecessor.46 Suppose, for instance, Congress were to enact a statute en-
trenching the one-year repeal of the estate tax scheduled for 2010.47 In 2009, 
Congress chooses to re-enact the estate tax for 2010. Why should today's 
43 Anthony Kronman has identified, and distinguished, these two types of error. 
Kronman, supra note 25, at 780-81. 
44 As Robert Ellickson has observed in a different context, "Because no one can predict 
the future , ... covenants that were originally well-tailored tend to become ill-fitting. " Robert C. 
Ellickson, Adverse Possession and Perpetuities Law: Two Dents in the Libertarian Model of 
Property Rights, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 723, 736 (1986). 
45 For instance, Posner and Vermeule argue that welfare reforms "depend on the govern-
ment being able to commit itself to withhold transfers from people who fail to obtain employ-
ment within the designated period of time." Posner & Vermeule, supra note 4, at 1671. In other 
words, government must induce potential recipients to seek work in reliance on the government 
commitment that further transfers will not be available if the recipients do not find work. 
46 See also Hadfield, supra note 23, at 526-37 (arguing that even when the government 
enters into a contract, the government's contract partner should be entitled to damages only 
when the partner can prove reliance). 
47 The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 
§ 501(a), repeals the estate tax for the year 2010. Absent additional congressional action, the tax 
will reappear in 2011 . 
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statute bind the 2009 Congress? No one has relied on today's statute, be-
cause no one has planned to die in 2010. If the 2009 Congress, reflecting 2009 
preferences, together with more current information about the country's fis-
cal state, chooses to reinstate the tax, there is little normative reason for the 
earlier statute-however entrenched-to stand in the way. 
This corollary finds an analogy in ordinary contract law. If I make a 
promise, and no one else changes position in reliance on my promise, no one 
has a right to enforce the promise.48 When the time for performance comes, 
I am not bound by my earlier promise. 
Return now to the situation in which the legislature's entrenching statute 
is intended to, and does, induce reliance by someone. The Posner/Vermeule 
argument suggests that if a subsequent legislature is not bound by the en-
trenchment position, the subsequent legislature has unilateral power to im-
pose external costs on those parties that relied on the entrenching statute. 
· · That potential for externalities would make it inefficient to permit repudia-
tion of the entrenching statute.49 
The Posner/Vermeule conclusion is true, but exaggerated. The subse-
quent legislature may believe repudiation of its predecessor's commitment is 
in its current interest, but the subsequent legislature will also recognize that a 
decision to repudiate will reduce its own ability to make commitments about 
the future.50 If parties whose behavior the government seeks to change learn 
that the government blithely repudiates its commitments, those parties will 
be less likely to rely on government commitments.51 Hence, even in a regime 
48 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17 (1988) (providing that formation of a 
contract requires consideration); id. § 90 (providing that even if a contract lacks consideration, 
the contract may be enforceable if: (1) the promisor should reasonably expect the promise to 
induce reliance; (2) the promise does induce reliance; and (3) enforcement is necessary to avoid 
injustice). For a recent study concluding that reliance remains critical to enforcement of 
promises not supported by consideration, see Robert A. Hillman, Questioning the "New Consen-
sus" on Promissory Estoppel: An Empirical and Theoretical Study, 98 CouJM. L. REv. 580 
(1998). 
49 Thus, Posner and Vermeule note that a "creditor might charge a government a lower 
interest rate if it knows that a future government cannot repudiate the contract without a 
supermajority vote." Posner & Vermeule, supra note 4, at 1671. In effect, they are arguing that 
if the future government could repudiate, potential creditors would fear this ability to impose 
externalities on them, leading them to charge an inefficiently high interest rate. 
so Indeed, because of widespread information about a government decision to repudiate a 
promise previously made, nonlegal sanctions for breach of promise may be relatively more effec-
tive as a constraint against government breach than as a constraint against private breach. See 
Sterk, supra note 20, at 663. 
51 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-
Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & EcoN. 875, 877 (1975) (suggesting that when Congress repeals 
legislation that a sponsoring interest group expects will endure, Congress will be able to extract 
less for similar legislation in the future). 
The Supreme Court, in the Winstar case, recognized the cost to the government when it 
abrogates its contracts, arguing that expanding the opportunities for abrogation of government 
contracts would have "the certain result of undermining the Government's credibility at the 
bargaining table and increasing the cost of its engagements." United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 
U.S. 839, 884 (1996). As Professor Hadfield has noted, however, the government frequently 
includes a "termination for convenience" clause in ordinary government contracts, with no ap-
parent loss of credibility. Hadfield, supra note 23, at 494-95. Even though contract partners 
know the government retains the legal right to terminate, those partners know that government 
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that does not permit one legislature to bind its successor through entrench-
ment, a legislature that seeks to repudiate a commitment made by one of its 
predecessors will bear many of the costs of the repudiation.52 It is this fact 
that has permitted states to sell "moral obligation bonds"-those that the 
state has no binding legal obligation to repay.53 
In evaluating, from a normative perspective, whether a previous legisla-
ture 's entrenchment provisions should bind a current legislature, one must 
balance the incremental ability to induce reliance that would be generated by 
binding entrenchment statutes against the inefficiencies generated by inade-
quate foresight. This tradeoff is not unique to entrenchment provisions. In-
deed, it is a central feature of contract law. Whenever parties make 
contracts, they do so with incomplete knowledge of future events and prefer-
ences.54 Contract law generally handles the problem by enforcing bargains 
(at least when accompanied by consideration or reliance), but by providing 
safety valves when enforcement would appear particularly inefficient. Bank-
ruptcy,55 commercial impracticability,56 frustration of purpose,57 and mistake 
are all doctrines that excuse a party from performance of "binding" obliga-
tions when the parties did not foresee the events that actually unfolded. With 
respect to state and municipal government contracts, the Supreme Court has 
interpreted the Contracts Clause of the Constitution to provide similar safety 
valves that relieve subsequent legislatures from contracts made by their pred-
ecessors in times when the events that have unfolded vary markedly from the 
ones the parties anticipated.58 
Although the contract analogy illustrates our legal system's hesitation to 
make long-term promises binding when foresight proves to have been partic-
ularly poor, routine contract enforcement would not be nearly as problematic 
as routine enforcement of entrenching provisions. Built in to contract law is 
will not lightly terminate, because of the impact termination would have on its future ability to 
contract. 
52 As Professor Hadfield has put it, "citizens feel morally outraged when governments 
walk away from contracts because they condemn opportunistic political actions that shift the 
costs of policy changes onto contracting parties." Hadfield, supra note 23, at 487. 
53 See, e.g. , Schultz v. State, 639 N.E .2d 1140, 1145-46 (N.Y . 1994) (discussing moral obli-
gation bonds); see also Peter W. Salsich, Jr., Urban Housing: A Strategic Role for the States, 12 
YALE L. & PoL'Y. REv. 93, 102 n.42 (1994) (describing a moral obligation bond as "a legally 
unenforceable, but politically enforceable pledge"). 
54 See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CHANGING YouR M1No: THE LAW OF REGRETTED DEc 1-
s1ONs 24 (1998) (noting that " [p]romises are made in the face of an uncertain future " and that 
" [c]ontracts are devices for dealing with uncertainty by allocating risks of future changes"). 
55 11 U.S.C. § 727 provides for a discharge of individual debtors in bankruptcy proceed-
ings. See Kronman, supra note 25 at 785 (discussing fresh start in bankruptcy as a protection 
against regretted decisions). 
56 See Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex Group, 499 F. Supp. 53, 76, 91 (W.D . Pa. 1980) 
(invoking the doctrines of commercial impracticability, frustration of purpose, and mistake, and 
candidly admitting that it was compensating for the parties' inability to foresee the future). 
57 FARNSWORTH, supra note 54 at 25 (discussing frustration of purpose and impracticabil-
ity of performance as doctrines designed to protect contracting parties against events "suffi-
ciently extraordinary to be regarded as beyond the risks assumed by the parties"). 
58 See, e.g., Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502 (1942) (uphold-
ing state legislation restructuring municipal debt in light of the great depression). See generally 
Sterk, supra note 20, at 675-86. 
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a significant safety valve: the parties to the contract can always renegotiate.59 
Thus, when one or more creditors threaten to enforce their contracts against 
a troubled debtor, the parties may-even without the auspices of a bank-
ruptcy court-negotiate a workout that relieves the debtor of some of its 
obligations in order to preserve the debtor as a going concern, and to in-
crease the chance that the creditors will be paid.60 The workout alternative 
also exists with government contracts.61 But when a legislature entrenches a 
statutory provision, there is no one with whom the subsequent legislature can 
negotiate. Posner and Vermeule appear to treat the prior legislature as an 
independent entity with power to bind its successors. But because the prior 
legislature no longer exists as a body, that legislature would be powerless to 
release the subsequent legislature from the obligations imposed by the en-
trenching legislation.62 
To summarize, old legislation cannot take account of the facts and pref-
erences that have changed since enactment of the legislation. A current leg-
59 In the words of Judge Cardozo, "Those who make a contract, may unmake it." Beatty 
v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 122 N.E. 378,381 (N.Y. 1919); see also Christine Jolls, Contracts 
and Bilateral Commitments: A New Perspective on Contract Modification, 26 J. LEG. STUD. 203 
(1997). In her effort to identify efficiency gains that might be realized if parties were free to 
restrict their own ability to modify, Jolls concedes that: "The prerogative of contractors to mod-
ify their original contract by mutual agreement is an article of faith for contract law. As between 
two competing expressions of consent-the original contract and the modification-the latter is 
chosen." Jolls, supra, at 204. Modification is generally permitted so long as the modification was 
prompted by some change in circumstance that would make performance unprofitable by the 
party seeking modification. By contrast, if no such reason accompanied the request for modifi-
cation, the modification will not generally be enforced, largely out of fear that the request for 
modification is simply an exercise of coercion by one party. See Jason Scott Johnston, Default 
Rules/Mandatory Principles: A Game Theoretic Analysis of Good Faith and the Contract Modifi-
cation Problem, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 335, 339-40 (1993). 
60 Cf Goebel v. Linn, 11 N.W. 284, 285 (1882). Justice Cooley explicitly noted the impor-
tance of modification to a promisee if the alternative is the promisor's insolvency: 
Id. 
Suppose, for example, the defendants had satisfied themselves that the ice com-
pany under the very extraordinary circumstances of the entire failure of the local 
crop of ice must be ruined if their existing contracts were to be insisted upon, and 
must be utterly unable to respond in damages, it is plain that then, whether they 
chose to rely upon their contract or not, it could have been of little or no value to 
them. Unexpected and extraordinary circumstances had rendered the contract 
worthless, and they must either make a new arrangement, or, in insisting on holding 
the ice company to the existing contract, they would ruin the ice company and 
thereby at the same time ruin themselves. 
61 Holdout problems may make it difficult for government entities to renegotiate debt 
contracts with large numbers of creditors, even when most of the creditors would find renegoti-
ation advantageous. This fact led to development of a municipal bankruptcy statute. See 
Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual Introduction 
to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 449-50 (1993). 
62 Limiting "dead hand control" has been a pervasive theme in property law. The rule 
against perpetuities, prohibitions against novel estates and a variety of other property law rules 
reflect, in part, the inability of subsequent generations to negotiate out of restrictions created by 
dead property owners. As Robert Ellickson has put it, "Consensual escapes from the grip of old 
restrictions are impossible because the dead are highly inflexible negotiators." Ellickson, supra 
note 44, at 736. Consensual escape from legislative entrenchment is similarly impossible if the 
entrenching legislature no longer exists. 
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islature always has more facts, and a better understanding of current 
preferences, than its predecessors did. Any model that permits a legislature 
to entrench legislation against future repeal or modification necessarily in-
troduces the inefficiencies associated with inadequate foresight. It is not self-
evident that the primary advantage of entrenchment-increased ability to in-
duce reliance-provides an adequate justification for enduring those 
inefficiencies. 
3. Agency Costs 
Posner and Vermeule's principal normative argument for permitting leg-
islative entrenchment rests on the premise that entrenchment enables gov-
ernment to achieve long-term objectives more effectively than would be 
possible without entrenchment. Even if their premise is correct, however, a 
regime permitting entrenchment would be desirable only if legislative deci-
sions to entrench account adequately for future preferences and interests. 
What does it mean for a legislative decision to account adequately for 
future preferences and interests? How a legislature should aggregate the 
preferences of its current constituents presents a serious theoretical problem. 
Introduction of future interests and preferences exacerbates the aggregation 
problem. No convenient reference point (such as one person, one vote) sug-
gests itself as a fulcrum for balancing the interests of present and future 
constituents. 63 
Moreover, even if the aggregation problem were theoretically soluble, 
no ready mechanism exists to hold current legislatures accountable to future 
constituents. Future persons do not have chips they can play in interest 
group politics, nor do they have votes they can register in the polling booth.64 
When a current legislature makes any future-regarding decision, includ-
ing a decision about entrenchment, it evaluates future interests and prefer-
ences through the lens of current constituents. Those constituents are 
inevitably concerned about their own futures and those of their descendants. 
But if they treat their public decisions the way they treat their private deci-
sions, they will generally discount the future benefits and costs associated 
with any significant decision.65 Indeed, important provisions in existing 
63 Cf Hadfield, supra note 23, at 525-26. Hadfield discusses similar efficiency problems in 
the context of government contracts: 
Id. 
How should one electorate be entitled to create costs and benefits for those who 
will form another electorate? How should one electorate be entitled to change the 
distribution of costs and benefits created by an earlier electorate? To conduct an 
efficiency analysis it is necessary to decide, first, who is in the welfare function-
whose preferences and endowments count. To the extent that one chooses as the 
efficiency benchmark the welfare of the currently represented population one re-
solves, a priori, the conflict between sovereignty and contract in favor of contract. 
Hence "efficiency" cannot be the criterion for resolving the conflict because it as-
sumes a particular resolution before the analysis starts. 
64 Cf E. Donald Elliott, Constitutional Conventions and the Deficit, 1985 DuKE L.J. 1077, 
1091-92 (1985) (observing that the unborn are impossible to organize, and therefore easy prey 
for politicians). 
65 See Ellickson, supra note 44, at 735-36 (noting that individuals typically care more about 
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law-mandatory social security, tax incentives to create IRAs-rest on the 
premise that individuals discount the future too heavily. Hence, it would be 
reasonable to expect legislatures to entrench statutes too quickly, at least if 
entrenchment generates present benefit at future cost. 
Perhaps more significant, a regime that authorizes entrenchment creates 
new opportunities for organized interest groups to secure benefits at public 
expense.66 Imagine, for instance, an industry seeking a tax preference. If 
entrenchment were not available, the industry's willingness to lobby for the 
preference would be constrained by recognition that the legislature could 
withdraw the preference during the next election year if the preference 
proved unpopular with voters, or with competing industries. But if the indus-
try could secure a promise that the preference would remain in effect ( either 
permanently or for a defined period) the industry would be more willing to 
expend money lobbying for the preference, increasing the likelihood of its 
enactment.67 
The PosnerNermeule response to these concerns is the standard re-
sponse they offer to every criticism of entrenchment. They argue that "en-
trenchment is only one of many devices that the present can use to ruin the 
future if it so wishes."68 Because we trust legislative majorities not to ruin 
the future with these other devices, we should also trust majorities not to use 
entrenchment inappropriately. In their words, "The parade of horribles pro-
voked by thinking about entrenchment statutes is no different from the 
parade of horribles provoked by thinking about democracy in general."69 
As usual, however, their response is over-simple. First, our legal system 
tolerates current legislative decisions that constrain future legislative deci-
sions because there is no practical alternative; without the power to affect 
future choices, no legislature could function. By contrast, entrenchment 
power is not necessary to legislative functioning-as two centuries of our 
own history have demonstrated. Second, our legal system has historically in-
corporated a number of institutional constraints on the power of one legisla-
the near future than the far future and have deeper affections for living descendants than for 
unborn ones). 
66 The public choice literature suggests that the political process generally favors the 
agenda of concentrated and organized interest groups at the expense of the more diffuse inter-
ests of the public at large. See generally JAMES M. BUCHANAN AND GORDON TULLOCK, THE 
CALCULUS OF CONSENT 287-89 (1962); MICHAEL T. HAYES, LoBBYJSTS AND LEGISLATORS: A 
THEORY OF PoLmCAL MARKETS 91 (1981); McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 2, at 509. 
67 Posner & Vermeule argue that an entrenchment regime will not necessarily increase the 
total amount invested in lobbying efforts. They conceded that the prospect of entrenchment 
may increase the initial investment in enacting legislation, but contend that this increase might 
be offset by a reduction in lobbying to protect legislation against repeal. Posner & Vermeule, 
supra note 4, at 1690-91. Their calculus, however, focuses only on lobbying expenditures-not 
on the long-term harm that might be generated by the legislation itself. A regime that permits 
entrenchment is likely to generate special interest legislation that would never be enacted in a 
regime that prohibits entrenchment simply because, without entrenchment, the special interests 
will find the total cost of the legislation (measured by initial lobbying costs and the future cost of 
defending their benefits against future attack) will exceed the expected benefit of the legislation, 
especially because repeal efforts might prove successful. 
68 Id. at 1691. 
69 Id. at 1692. 
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ture to bind future constituents. State constitutional limits on the power to 
incur debt7° and judicial review of the enforceability of government con-
tracts71 furnish two examples. That is, our existing legal system regularly ex-
hibits heightened concern about legislation with potentially significant impact 
on the future. Against this background, the case for untrammeled legislative 
power to entrench statutes is far from self-evident. 
C. Evaluating the Alternatives 
1. The Alternatives 
Legislative entrenchment can take several forms. Both the advantages 
entrenchment offers and the problems it creates vary with the form of en-
trenchment. This section explores alternative forms of entrenchment, and 
suggests that alternatives largely ignored by Posner and Vermeule are norma-
tively superior to the regime they apparently favor. 
The regime that serves as the target for Posner and Vermeule is one in 
which any entrenching statute would be invalid and of no effect. Presumably, 
in such a regime, any person with standing to challenge the entrenching stat-
ute could obtain a declaration of the statute's invalidity. Once such a posi-
tion became embedded in doctrine, legislators would be reluctant to support 
entrenchment, because to do so would be to support unconstitutional legisla-
tion. Moreover, if any subsequent legislature could disavow previously en-
acted entrenching legislation as void, no one would have reason to rely on 
entrenchment provisions, and no legislature could realize any of the advan-
tages of entrenching legislation. 
In reaction to this target regime, Posner and Vermeule appear to en-
dorse the regime's polar opposite: a subsequent legislature would be acting 
illegally if it chose to modify or repeal entrenching legislation. Posner and 
Vermeule waffle on whether an entrenchment provision should be judicially 
enforceable, but nowhere in their article do they suggest a reason why courts 
should not enforce entrenchment provisions against "illegal" contradictory 
legislation. 
What Posner and Vermeule do not consider are intermediate alterna-
tives. One such alternative would be to treat entrenchment statutes as valid, 
but subject to repeal by subsequent legislation. At first glance, this alterna-
tive appears similar to the "no entrenchment" regime. In fact, however, 
there are significant differences. First, when entrenchment is procedural-
e.g., "no new taxes shall be enacted without the affirmative vote of two-thirds 
of the members of each house of the legislature"-the entrenched statute 
would remain in full effect unless and until a subsequent legislature, by ma-
jority vote, repealed the entrenching legislation.72 That is, in this regime, tax 
legislation enacted without two-thirds majorities, and before repeal, would 
simply be ineffective. Second, even when entrenchment is absolute on its 
face-e.g., "no import tariffs shall ever be enacted"-the statute would serve 
70 See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
71 See infra note 73 and accompanying text. 
72 Cf McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 2, at 500-07 (1995) (explaining why a 
supermajority rule promulgated by the House would be subject to repeal by majority vote). 
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as a valid promise by the legislature, much like a promise made by an individ-
ual: the promise would not be judicially enforceable, but breaking the prom-
ise would visit reputational disadvantages on the promisor. That is, 
whenever a legislature broke a promise made by its legislative predecessors, 
the legislature would make it more difficult to convince parties to rely on its 
current promises. 
A second intermediate alternative would be to hold entrenchment stat-
utes valid and enforceable, but to permit subsequent legislatures to repeal 
those statutes when the subsequent legislature can demonstrate-to the satis-
faction of a court-that adherence to the statute would interfere with its ex-
ercise of sovereign power. This model would, in many ways, be similar to the 
Supreme Court's Contracts Clause jurisprudence: government contracts are 
enforceable, but the government is excused from performance if it can 
demonstrate a pressing need.73 
Both of these alternative entrenchment models would avoid the most 
problematic features of the PosnerNermeule model. Both models provide 
subsequent legislatures with "escape valves" from the straitjacket of absolute 
entrenchment. Which model is superior depends in part on one's assessment 
of the capacity of legislatures to account for future events. The following 
subsections demonstrate that the absolute entrenchment model is difficult to 
justify in the face of these alternatives. 
2. Entrenchment in Legislatures that Account Well for Future Events 
Consider a hypothetical legislature that accounts perfectly for future 
preferences and interests. That is, suppose the legislature predicts the future 
accurately, understands future preferences, and does not unduly discount the 
future. With this sort of enlightened and omniscient legislature, the Posner/ 
Vermeule model would appear ideal: the current legislature would only en-
trench statutes in circumstances when even its successors would agree that 
entrenchment is warranted. 
In fact, however, if legislatures were generally omniscient and appropri-
ately solicitous of future interests, a regime permitting repeal of entrenched 
statutes would be almost as attractive. First, a subsequent legislature would 
almost never have any reason to repeal, because its predecessor, by virtue of 
its omniscience and solicitude, would not have entrenched the statute unless 
entrenchment was helpful to its successor. So long as the entrenching legisla-
ture was not shifting costs from the present to the future, any subsequent 
legislature would want to keep the entrenched legislation. 
Second, even if entrenching a particular statute did shift costs from the 
present to the future,74 a subsequent legislature would be hesitant to repeal 
73 See Sterk, supra note 20, at 675-85 ( detailing history of "police power" justification for 
refusing to enforce state government contracts); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The History of the 
Judicial Impairment "Doctrine" and its Lessons for the Contract Clause, 44 STAN. L. REv. 1373, 
1402-12 (1992) (detailing fears that led to judicial willingness to excuse states from performing 
con tracts) . 
74 Cost-shifting is not inconsistent with the hypothesis of omniscience and appropriate dis-
count of the future; sometimes, imposing small costs on the future will generate large immediate 
benefits. 
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the entrenched statute because repeal would inhibit its own ability to induce 
reliance by entrenching new statutes. Moreover, the subsequent legislature 
(which, by hypothesis, accounts for future preferences and interests) would 
want to preserve the ability of its own successors to entrench legislation, and 
repeal would make it more difficult for future legislatures to entrench stat-
utes. Hence, only when an entrenched statute imposes a particularly onerous 
burden on a subsequent legislature would that legislature be likely to repeal 
the statute. And, given the hypothesis that each legislature accounts per-
fectly for future interests and preferences, a legislature would almost never 
entrench a statute that imposes onerous burdens on its successors. As a re-
sult, if we assume that legislatures account perfectly for future preferences 
and interests, either of two regimes-the PosnerNermeule regime or a re-
gime that permits subsequent legislatures to repeal entrenched statutes-
would accomplish nearly the same objectives. 
Of course, the hypothesis of legislatures that account perfectly for future 
interests and preferences is unrealistic. Suppose, however, we hypothesize a 
legislature whose decisions account for future interests and preferences a 
high percentage of the time, but not always. If each legislature attempts to 
discount future interests fairly, but each legislature has less-than-perfect fore-
sight, a subsequent legislature's decisions will generally be better than the 
decisions of its predecessors, simply because the subsequent legislature has 
more information at its disposal. The subsequent legislature can base its de-
cision on facts not available at the time of the initial decision. From the per-
spective at T2, the time at which the subsequent legislature considers repeal, a 
regime permitting repeal is clearly preferable to one that proscribes repeal of 
entrenched statutes. 
In the PosnerNermeule model, the subsequent legislature would be 
bound to a statute entrenched by a prior legislature, even if facts that subse-
quently come to light reveal the folly of that statute. The normative argu-
ment for their position must focus on T1, the time at which the initial 
legislature decides whether to entrench. Posner and Vermeule do not de-
velop this argument, but the argument must rest on the premise that the ini-
tial legislature is in the best position to evaluate the benefits and costs of 
entrenchment. Assuming the initial legislature fairly discounts future costs 
and benefits, a decision to entrench reflects a judgment that the benefits of 
entrenchment exceed its costs-including the cost of error resulting from the 
legislature's own imperfect foresight. Just as individual and corporate deci-
sion-makers have power to make binding commitments, legislative decision-
makers should have power to make such commitments, even if some of them 
tum out badly because, over time, the public will be better served by a re-
gime in which commitments are possible. 
Put in other terms, suppose the legislature has available two alternatives: 
(1) full entrenchment of a statute, which would bind subsequent legislatures 
and prevent repeal of the original statute; and (2) a non-binding promise that 
current legislation will not be repealed. Let B represent the expected bene-
fit , over time, associated with full entrenchment. Let C represent the cost of 
full entrenchment-including the cost of error resulting from defective fore-
sight. Let B' represent the expected benefit associated with a non-binding 
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promise. B' will often be less than B because the lesser commitment may 
induce less reliance than a binding commitment. Finally, let C' represent the 
cost associated with a non-binding promise. C' will always be smaller than C 
because C' reduces the costs of potential error in foresight; a successor legis-
lature has power to repeal all legislation. Under these circumstances, a legis-
lature will entrench legislation if and only if B-C > B'-C'. The circumstances 
justifying entrenchment may be rare, but when a legislature does entrench, 
the argument runs, the legislature's decision should govern. 
The problem with this argument is that structuring the legal regime to 
permit full entrenchment changes the value of other alternatives. When full 
entrenchment is available, any commitment short of full entrenchment will 
appear to be a half measure, signaling to parties whose reliance is sought that 
the legislature half expects future repeal. In addition, a commitment short of 
full entrenchment will make it easier for a subsequent legislature to escape its 
promise; the subsequent legislature will be free to explain that if its predeces-
sor had really meant its promise, it would have fully entrenched the statute. 
Hence, the subsequent legislature will find it easier to repudiate without neg-
atively affecting its own ability to make commitments in the future . As a 
result, parties might be reluctant to rely on a non-binding promise, or on a 
procedural entrenchment such as a supermajority voting rule. By contrast, if 
full entrenchment is not available, a statute that makes a non-binding prom-
ise that the statute will not be repealed is likely to induce more reliance than 
the same promise in a regime that permits full entrenchment. First, the legis-
lature can honestly represent that the non-binding promise represents the 
strongest commitment it has legal power to make. Second, subsequent legis-
latures are likely to find it more difficult to repudiate such a promise without 
negatively affecting their own ability to induce reliance on promises. Hence, 
the same non-binding promise will be more valuable than in a regime that 
permits binding promises. Similarly, procedural entrenchment-such as a 
supermajority-voting rule for taking certain actions-will be more valuable in 
a regime that prohibits binding promises. 
Algebraically, let B" represent the benefit associated with a non-binding 
promise in a regime that does not permit full entrenchment. B" will be sig-
nificantly greater than B'. If C" represents the cost of a non-binding promise 
in this regime, C" may also be greater than C', because future legisla-
tures will find it more difficult to repudiate an unwise promise. Even if 
B-C > B'-C', there is no reason to believe that B-C > B"-C". Indeed, some-
times, B" will be greater than B. In some cases, knowledge that a subsequent 
legislature is entitled to repeal entrenched statutes makes the legislature's 
commitment worth more, not less, than a commitment without power to re-
peal. When the initial legislature's decision to entrench becomes, with the 
benefit of hindsight, a clear error, the harm of adhering to the entrenched 
statute may be visited not merely on the government, but also on the parties 
induced to rely on entrenchment. But, if a subsequent legislature has no 
power to repeal, there is no escape hatch for either party. Moreover, because 
the government may be seeking to induce reliance in a large number of un-
identified parties, the government cannot contract with those parties to undo 
the entrenched legislation. Only a power to repeal the entrenched legislation 
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will rescue the parties whose reliance the government seeks to induce. 
Hence, giving subsequent legislatures power to repeal entrenched legislation 
would be of benefit to those parties as well as to the government itself. 
The following example illustrates this benefit. In order to promote eco-
nomic development on an island site, a state legislature pays for and builds a 
bridge. Building the bridge does not generate enough new development be-
cause businesses and residents fear that the state will restrict access or im-
pose heavy tolls. In response, the legislature enacts a statute promising that 
the state will never restrict access to the bridge or collect tolls on the bridge. 
Posner and Vermeule recognize that such entrenching legislation may induce 
businesses and individuals to relocate to the island. But once the legislature 
makes the promise of perpetual free access, will individuals and businesses 
rely less on the promise if subsequent legislatures have power to repeal the 
statute? The Posner/Vermeule model suggests that the answer is yes; unless 
subsequent legislatures are bound, entrenchment .will be less effective in in-
ducing reliance. 
In fact, however, it is possible (if not likely) that permitting future legis-
latures to repeal the statute will generate more reliance on the original prom-
ise. The future might bring overcrowding rather than underdevelopment, or 
the bridge construction might not hold up under long-term use, requiring a 
greater-than-anticipated maintenance investment. Potential island residents 
and businesses might be better off if they know that the legislature will be 
able to repeal its commitment in circumstances like these. That is, B" might 
be greater than B in this circumstance, but a regime that permits full en-
trenchment might never permit the original legislature to realize B". 
Even if there are circumstances in which absolute entrenchment would 
induce greater reliance than any other alternative, a regime permitting abso-
lute entrenchment would still be undesirable if a legislature acting in that 
regime would rarely use its power to entrench legislation. That is, suppose 
there are few cases in which B-C > B '-C'. In this circumstance, the costs of 
absolute entrenchment, particularly the inability of future legislatures to ad-
just in case of error, generally deters legislatures from absolute entrench-
ment. If there are few cases in which B-C > B'-C', there will be fewer still 
where B-C > B"-C" . Yet the cases in which B-C is greater than both B'-C' 
and B"-C" are the only cases in which a regime permitting absolute en-
trenchment will generate benefits not available in a regime that does not per-
mit absolute entrenchment. Far more common will be the cases in which 
B'-C' > B-C-the cases in which a legislature would not absolutely entrench 
even if given the opportunity. Suppose, however, that in a significant subset 
of these cases, B "-C" > B '-C'. That is, suppose that in this subset of cases, 
the optimal legislative commitment is a promise by a legislature that lacks 
power to make the promise absolutely binding. For this subset of cases, a 
regime that permits absolute entrenchment will generate losses because the 
legislature will not be able to generate B"-C". 
In summary, even if we assume that legislatures generally account well 
for future events, whether a regime that permits full entrenchment is more 
efficient than a regime that prohibits full entrenchment-even from the per-
spective of Ti, the time at which a legislature considers entrenchment-is 
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indeterminate at best. From the perspective of T2, a regime that prohibits 
entrenchment is clearly more efficient. As a result, from a normative per-
spective, a regime that prohibits full entrenchment appears preferable, even 
apart from intergenerational equity concerns. 
3. Entrenchment in Legislatures that Account Poorly for Future Events 
Suppose now that legislatures do not account well for future preferences 
and interests-that they are generally unable to anticipate future preferences 
and that they systematically discount future benefits and costs. Suppose, for 
instance, that agency costs stand in the way of efficient legislative decisions. 
On this assumption, any model of legislative supremacy, whether a model 
that permits each legislature to bind its successors or one that permits each 
legislature to avoid commitments by its predecessors, appears undesirable 
from a normative perspective. 
In such a model, if legislatures enjoy the power to entrench statutes ab-
solutely, they will exercise the power too freely. If a legislature can derive 
immediate benefit from entrenchment, the legislature is likely to entrench 
even if the long-run costs, which the legislature does not anticipate or does 
not care about, are likely to exceed the immediate benefits. 
A regime that gives each legislature power to repeal any entrenched 
statute fares little better. Each legislature is likely to act too quickly to repu-
diate statutes entrenched by its predecessors if the legislature can derive im-
mediate benefit from repudiation. The legislature will discount the future 
cost of repudiation-particularly the reduced ability of future legislatures to 
make commitments that will induce reliance. 
On the assumption that legislatures are poorly suited to account for the 
future , then, it would be preferable to confer decision-making authority on 
another institution with better capacity to make long-run decisions. For in-
stance, if courts do not face the same agency costs as legislatures, courts 
might be in a better position than any legislature-past or future-to deter-
mine whether particular entrenchment statutes should bind successor legisla-
tures. That is, if one legislature entrenched a statute, and a subsequent 
legislature repealed the entrenched statute, a court could evaluate whether 
enforcing the repeal would generate greater benefits (both in correcting a 
past legislature's error and in making it more difficult for the current legisla-
ture to make binding, but unwise, promises) than costs (largely in making it 
more difficult for the current legislature to make valuable promises). If 
courts are institutionally better suited than legislatures to make such deci-
sions, this regime would lead to better results than either a regime in which 
entrenched statutes were always binding on successors or never binding on 
successors. 
As a doctrinal matter, such a regime would be possible to develop. For 
instance, courts could determine that entrenchment statutes bind subsequent 
legislatures unless the entrenchment interferes with the subsequent legisla-
ture's sovereign police power. This kind of amorphous standard would per-
mit courts to determine whether the original legislature's promise was 
sufficiently unwise to permit a successor legislature to escape from the prom-
ise. For a period in its history, the Supreme Court took this approach to the 
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Federal Constitution's Contracts Clause. The Court's approach permitted a 
subsequent legislature was entitled to repudiate an obligation of its predeces-
sors if the Court determined that the contract impinged upon the legislature's 
police power.75 The Court could take a similar approach to entrenchment 
statutes if it appeared that courts were better suited than legislatures to eval-
uate future preferences and interests. 
For present purposes, the point is that if agency costs lead legislatures to 
account poorly for future preferences and interests, a regime that permits 
absolute entrenchment is inferior, from a normative perspective, to a regime 
that leaves the effect of entrenchment provisions to another institution less 
affected by agency cost problems. Rather than the PosnerNermeule model, 
one would prefer a model in which courts exercised discretion over the en-
forceability of entrenchment provisions. 
4. Summary 
The preceding sections have demonstrated that whatever view one takes 
of legislative capacity to account for the future, a regime that permits abso-
lute entrenchment is inferior, from a normative point of view, to alternatives 
that relieve subsequent legislatures from some of the commitments made by 
their predecessors. Which set of escape valves is preferable depends on one's 
general view of legislative capacity to account for future preferences and 
interests. 
Nothing in this discussion, however, suggests that legislatures should be 
prevented from enacting entrenchments, so long as those entrenchments are 
subject to repeal by an ordinary statute enacted by a subsequent legislature. 
For instance, Professors McGinnis and Rappaport have demonstrated that 
supermajority rules, a form of procedural entrenchment, may be normatively 
attractive as a mechanism for overcoming agency costs, while at the same 
time leaving the powers of subsequent legislatures intact.76 
Ill. Entrenchment Within the Constitutional Scheme 
Posner and Vermeule's article was written against a background in which 
many commentators had attacked legislative entrenchment as unconstitu-
tional. As a result, their article attempts not only to make a normative case 
for entrenchment, but a constitutional case as well. Much of their constitu-
tional discussion is devoted to rebutting the argument that the Federal Con-
stitution prohibits legislative entrenchment. To that end, Posner and 
Vermeule address arguments that purport to establish that entrenchment is 
inconsistent with a variety of constitutional provisions.77 
75 See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
76 See John 0 . McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Supermajority Rules as a Constitutional 
Solution, 40 WM. & MARYL. REV. 365 (1999); John 0 . McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The 
Rights of Legislators and the Wrongs of Interpretation: A Further Defense of the Constitutionality 
of Legislative Supermajority Rules, 47 DuKE L.J. 327 (1997); McGinnis & Rappaport, Legislative 
Supermajority Requirements, supra note 2, at 483. 
77 Posner & Verrneule, supra note 4, at 1673-85. 
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In their rebuttal of existing constitutional scholarship, however, Posner 
and Vermeule do not point to constitutional provisions that would affirma-
tively require subsequent legislatures to honor entrenchment provisions en-
acted by their predecessors. Instead, the PosnerNermeule position appears 
to be that, in the absence of an explicit constitutional provision, the enforce-
ability of entrenchment provisions should be determined by normative argu-
ment.78 Because, in their view, a regime permitting legislative entrenchment 
is normatively superior, the Constitution effectively authorizes 
entrenchment. 
As a result, Posner and Vermeule's constitutional argument rests entirely 
on their normative argument.799 If, as the previous section demonstrates, an 
entrenchment regime is not normatively superior, their argument collapses; 
with one minor exception, they advance no originalist or structural reason 
why one legislature should be bound by actions of its predecessor, and they 
reject arguments from tradition.800 
Posner and Vermeule do invoke one structural analogy to support their 
position that the Constitution authorizes absolute legislative entrenchment. 
They point out that Article V of the Federal Constitution entrenches several 
constitutional provisions against subsequent amendment,81 and they ask "[i]f 
constitutional framers may entrench constitutional provisions against later 
framers, why may not legislatures entrench statutory provisions against later 
legislatures?"82 Posner and Vermeule emphasize, in particular, Article V's 
proviso that "no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal 
Suffrage in the Senate. "83 
The analogy, however, misses the mark. The objective of the Constitu-
tional Convention was to develop governance principles and procedures that 
all states would accept.84 No state was bound to accept or abide by the Fed-
eral Constitution merely because a majority of states-or even all of the 
78 Id. Posner and Vermeule argue explicitly that the normative argument trumps tradition 
in the debate over entrenchment rules, and they attempt to rebut claims "rooted in constitu-
tional and political theory." Id . at 1680. 
79 In a forthcoming article, Professors McGinnis and Rappaport examine the Posner/ 
Vermeule argument as a matter of original intent, and find it wanting. See John 0. McGinnis & 
Michael B. Rappaport, Symmetric Entrenchment: A Constitutional and Normative Theory, 89 
VA. L. REv. (forthcoming 2003). 
80 They contend that "tradition is never a conclusive argument in American constitutional 
practice," and observe that "[o)ur meta-tradition, the only one we invariably adhere to, is to 
dump traditional practices overboard when their claims on our rational or normative allegiance 
wear too thin." Posner & Vermeule, supra note 4, at 1679. 
81 U.S. CoNsT. art. V., (the Amendment Clause), concludes with the following proviso: 
Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand 
eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the fist and fourth Clauses in 
the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall 
be deprived of it's equal Suffrage in the Senate. 
82 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 4, at 1681. 
83 Id. U.S. CoNsT., art. V. 
84 The Constitutional Convention arose out of the perceived inadequacies of the Articles 
of Confederation. For discussions of the Convention's history, see Bruce Ackerman & Neal 
Katya!, Our Unconventional Founding, 62 U. Ctt1. L. REv. 475 (1995); Henry Paul Monaghan, 
We the People{s], Original Understanding, and Constitutional Amendment, 96 CoLUM. L. REv. 
121, 139-57 (1996). 
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other states-chose to ratify the Constitution.85 Viewed in this light, the "en-
trenchment" provision cited by Posner and Vermeule simply restates the rule 
to which the original Constitution was subject-no state may be bound with-
out its consent. Those who would amend the Constitution to eliminate equal 
suffrage in the Senate would have the same freedom of action as the original 
framers. By contrast the absolute legislative entrenchment endorsed by Pos-
ner and Vermeule would leave subsequent legislatures with far less freedom 
of action than the legislature that enacted the entrenching statute. Article V, 
therefore, provides no affirmative constitutional basis for absolute 
entrenchment. 
Conclusion 
In their recent article, Professors Posner and Vermeule have made a 
mountain out of a molehill. As they candidly note, the academic literature 
and the courts have taken it as a given that legislative entrenchment is "con-
stitutionally or normatively objectionable."86 They concede that "there are 
not many examples of entrenchments currently in force."87 The few exam-
ples of entrenchment they discuss-among them Gramm-Rudman-leave 
subsequent legislatures completely free to act, so long as they follow statu-
tory procedures that may themselves be repealed by majority vote. Perhaps 
the absence of absolute legislative entrenchments reflects, at least in part, the 
general understanding that Posner and Vermeule attack. But the normative 
and constitutional arguments Posner and Vermeule advance do nothing to 
undermine that general understanding. 
85 Indeed, the more pressing contemporary legal problem was whether the new Constitu-
tion could bind any state until all states had consented to amendment or abandonment of the 
Articles of Confederation, which, by their terms, could be amended only with the unanimous 
consent of the states. For discussion of contemporary treatment of this problem, see Ackerman 
& Katya!, supra note 84, at 539-68. 
86 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 4, at 1665-66. 
87 Id. at 1693. 
